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Along with other Western states, Germany is facing the uncertainties after the coup
on 1 February by the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw. Germany has multiple foreign
policy operations within Myanmar, with political parties advancing various agendas
supporting Myanmar’s democratization. Myanmar is not the only development aid
project but one of a slate of countries representing German interests in Southeast
Asia. Myanmar’s place in German foreign policy, however, is now disrupted by the
coup. The prospects of a return to military rule suggest a need for a German rethink
of its Myanmar strategies.
There are a number of factors that should be considered in a German foreign
policy response to the Myanmar crisis. It is important to note the attempted legal
justification asserted by the Tatmadaw for the coup and the inconsistency in internal
logic in the coup. It is also relevant to consider the potential outcome scenarios. It is
further useful to recognize the factors that may allow Germany to fashion alternative
scenarios.
Observations informing German reconsiderations
 German considerations vis-à-vis Myanmar should be informed by a number of
observations. First, the presence of legal arguments for the coup. Foreign audiences
may be tempted to see the Tatmadaw’s takeover of an elected civilian government
as emblematic of a broader Asian history that adhered to Mao’s dictum “Power
comes from the barrel of a gun.” The Tatmadaw has made efforts to justify their
actions through legal arguments. Specifically, the Tatmadaw alleges voter fraud
in Myanmar’s November 2020 elections were unaddressed by the country’s Union
Election Commission. This event spurred the military to invoke Sections 417-418 of
Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution for a state of emergency through which all executive,
legislative, and judicial powers were transferred to the military. Under Sections
417-418, the military announced that it would hold new elections after a year.
Such technical reasoning indicates an attempt to seek the legitimacy of law, with
the constitution serving as an instrumental function to justify political ambition.
International and domestic critics of the coup note that Sections 417-418 require
a state of emergency to be declared by the elected civilian President. In order to
circumvent that provision, the Tatmadaw accused President Win Myint of crimes,
arrested him, and then substituted him with a military-supported replacement who
promptly handed over power to the military. The Tatmadaw also arrested Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor and head of the National League for Democracy
(NLD), for alleged crimes. The Tatmadaw went further, arresting all the Hluttaw
members of the parliament, whether or not they belonged to the ruling NLD or other
political parties. As much as critics point to such actions as indicators of ambitions
to reinstate military rule, the effort to cite the 2008 Constitution, even if problematic,
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indicates a desire for the Tatmadaw to be recognized by international and domestic
audiences as the legitimate sovereign political authority for Myanmar.
Second, it is unclear why the Tatmadaw believes that a coup places them in a better
position than they enjoyed under the 2008 Constitution. Under the 2008 Constitution,
Myanmar is not a democracy but rather what political scholars term a “hybrid regime”
combining democratic and authoritarian elements. The 2008 Constitution placed the
Ministry of Border Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of Defense under
the military’s control and further allocated 25 percent of seats to military officers by
rule. Such a military presence in legislative and executive affairs is comparable to
Suharto-era Indonesia’s regimes and the current Thailand government. During the
2008 Constitution, the Tatmadaw retained a prominent political role, maintained
its ownership over major business enterprises, and profited from a restoration of
international trade and foreign investment. Simultaneously, they benefited from the
civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, willingly accepting international blame for
the military’s actions against the Rohingya. To set aside such privileges for a coup
suggests ulterior motivations: Either a belief that the global community will recognize
its authority and powers or that international opprobrium will be merely temporary
and superficial. The issue, however, is that hybrid regimes tend to be unstable.
A study by the United States State Failure Task Force in 2000 found that hybrid
regimes are the most unstable of all political systems and invariably collapse due
to intractable internal conflicts that force either a reversal to full authoritarianism or
transition to full democracy. As a hybrid regime, Myanmar was always in transition
between an authoritarian military and a democratic civilian populace. The military’s
belief that it can engineer a revised hybrid system thus ignores history’s lessons and
ignores domestic realities.
Potential scenarios
 The above uncertainties leave open a range of potential scenarios, each of which
poses its particular problems. The first potential scenario is a “hard coup” returning
Myanmar to the conditions of the years 1990s to 2000s, when the military focused
on subjugating the population, ceased all development, and minimize international
cooperation. This would be most tragic for Myanmar’s people, which under the
2008 Constitution emerged from isolation to learn about the broader world and
engage with the promises of global opportunities. The second scenario is a “soft
coup” similar to Thailand, with a military-dominated state controlling development
and enjoying full international cooperation. This would effectively add a more
authoritarian flavor to the 2008 Constitution. However, the West is more tolerant
of the Thai military than the Tatmadaw. An acceptance of a military coup would be
galling for pro-democracy foreign policy agendas of Western states. In addition,
the comparative socio-economic status of Thailand and Myanmar shows that the
Thai military is more competent in development policy than the Myanmar military.
It remains unclear if the current Myanmar military has the capacity to solve socio-
economic problems effectively. The last scenario is “aimlessness,” with various
factions vying for authority. Consequently, the conflicts in decision-making will lead
to inconsistent or contradictory policies. This is counter-productive for the country’s
progress but is also problematic for international actors seeking to establish relations
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with Myanmar. Without the certainty, predictability, or stability necessary for long-
term deals, international actors will deter from Myanmar to seek better opportunities
elsewhere.
Factors towards alternative scenarios
None of the above scenarios is entirely palatable for German foreign policy and
requires Germany to create alternatives. In seeking alternatives, it is helpful to
consider that the circumstances in Myanmar are different now compared to the
previous uprisings of 1988 and 2007. In particular, Myanmar’s civilian population
is far more sophisticated than previous generations, with the time under the
2008 Constitution involving the wide proliferation of 21st century information
and communications technology that opened Myanmar society and connected
it physically to international goods and services and intellectually global ideas
and practices. Recent events in the coup testify to this—as much as international
news audiences may have interpreted the initial tentative protests as signs of
a timid population, they overlooked the unseen deployment of social media,
and other internet resources that fostered a civil disobedience movement that
references international political and social vernacular; cites Western principles of
civil disobedience; and seeks outreach to the international community. With such
crowd-driven technology, the civil disobedience movement has been amorphous,
spontaneous, and viral, spreading to span cities and towns across the country and
involving civil society, government civil servants, and private sector actors, without
the need for leadership, enabling faster and more dynamic civil society responses
than the Myanmar that existed in 1988 or 2007. The challenge for Myanmar’s
population’s intellectual growth is to maintain internet and wi-fi access, which is a
function of military willingness to suffer nation-wide internet shutdowns.
Such sophistication also extends to civilian leadership. Of particular significance for
foreign states is the awareness of international law debates regarding states and
governments’ recognition. Despite the military takeover, Myanmar parliamentarians
formed a separate Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH),
claiming to be the legitimate political authority for the Myanmar state. Such
effort suggests an understanding of the nuances of diplomatic debates towards
recognizing a state or a government to provide evidence to raise questions regarding
effective control, political legitimacy, and subsequently diplomatic ties. The challenge
will be to continue existence under a military regime retaining the instruments of
violent force.
A final note is the nature of 21st century international business. Under the 2008
Constitution, Myanmar gradually increased engagement with the global economy.
While critics were frustrated by the slow pace engagement, it was sufficient to
expose Myanmar’s economy to international private sector actors. The behavior
of such actors in a 21st century global economy is marked by increased sensitivity
to public reputation, shareholder activism, and alternative global options. This has
already manifested itself in the current coup, with Thailand’s Amata Corporation
announcing a halt of a US$1 billion real estate development and Japan’s Kirin
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announcing the end of its partnership with the military-owned Myanmar Economic
Holdings. Such events point to the concerns of private markets for shareholder
sensitivities and public reputations. In the wake of the coup, more foreign investors
will likely withdraw from Myanmar until there is assurance of conditions more
acceptable to international shareholders and the global public.
Conclusion
Whether the above 21st century trends are sufficient to alter outcomes for Myanmar
are unclear. However, they do provide additional factors for German foreign policy
considerations that were not present in the previous 1988 and 2007 uprisings.
Whatever Germany’s ultimate deliberations regarding Myanmar will be, any
action should be done in concert with other Western democratic states. The past
decade has witnessed a global erosion of democracy, with a disturbing number of
regressions occurring within Southeast Asia. Because of its geostrategic position
between India and China, Myanmar constitutes a bulwark against the further erosion
of democracy out of Southeast Asia into the Indian Ocean. Further, despite the
Tatmadaw’s historical efforts, Myanmar is a fragile state that has been chronically
beset by internal conflicts with armed ethnic groups sustained by illicit, mutually
supportive trade networks in gemstones, timber, wildlife, people, narcotics, and
weapons. Such problems have made Myanmar a source of refugees, crimes, and
conflict, straining the resources of Myanmar’s South Asian and Southeast Asian
neighbours. Myanmar is a destabilizing presence for both regions. To the extent that
Germany and the West have interests in South Asia and Southeast Asia, there is a
need for unified action to address the geostrategic scale of problems posed by the
recent coup.
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